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Abstract We explore the process of professional-
ization pre- and post-buyout (MBO) or buyin (MBI) of
former private family firms using longitudinal evi-
dence from six UK family firms undergoing anMBO/I
in 1998. Professionalization behaviour was monitored
up to 2014. Previous studies have conceptualized
professionalization as a threshold to be attained. We
demonstrate that professionalization is a complex
process occurring in waves, triggered by changes in
firm ownership and management. Waves of profes-
sionalization converge during the MBO/I process.
Buyouts provide a funnelling mechanism enabling
diverse control systems to be standardized. Post-
MBO/I, divergence in the professionalization process
reoccurs contingent on firm-specific contexts. Profes-
sionalization focuses on operations when stewardship
relationships predominate, but on agency control
mechanisms when there is increased potential for
agency costs. Buyout organizational form is an
important transitory phase facilitating the profession-
alization process. Professionalization is not a once-
for-all development stage.
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1 Introduction
Despite most firms being family owned or controlled,
family managers are often assumed to be non-profes-
sional and contrasted with non-family ‘professional’
managers (Hall and Nordqvist 2008). However, some
family managers may be highly educated and skilled,
whereas some non-family managers may not (Stewart
and Hitt 2012). Regardless, studies of family firms
focus on introducing non-family managers as a route
to professionalization (Dekker et al. 2015). Despite
concerns (Stewart and Hitt 2012), engagement in
professionalization has been reduced to a binary
variable. Dekker et al. (2015) assert that profession-
alization needs to be conceptualized as a multi-faceted
process.
Professionalization is seen as a threshold stage that
firms need to attain to progress. Professionalized firms
are assumed better able to circumvent business
development barriers, with the management style
and organizational structure to ensure firm growth.
However, few studies have examined the dynamic
professionalization process. Even with a multi-faceted
professionalization process approach, professionaliza-
tion is often reduced to a checklist in cross-sectional
studies exploring the link between professionalization
propensity and variations in firm performance (Dekker
et al. 2015). Cross-sectional studies provide limited
insights into causal process relationships, being lim-
ited to analysing the co-existence of specific variables
(Yildirim-O¨ktem and U¨sdiken 2010). Professionaliza-
tion does not happen overnight (Dekker et al. 2015).
We need, therefore, to understand the temporal
dynamics of the process of professionalization in
private family-owned firms before conclusions can be
drawn about causality, but few studies have explored
the process (Hall and Nordqvist 2008; De Massis et al.
2014).
Lack of understanding is partly due to the dearth of
longitudinal analysis. Longitudinal studies are war-
ranted to explore whether current conceptualizations
of professionalization are appropriate for family firms
(Stewart and Hitt 2012). We examine longitudinal
cases of six UK private family firms over 16 years.
Professionalization is monitored before, during and
after management buyout (MBO) or buyin (MBI). By
examining buyouts of private family firms, we view
a discrete event relating to ownership and manage-
ment changes. The MBO/I context contributes to
understanding of family firms (Chrisman et al. 2012)
and where the buyout may facilitate professionaliza-
tion in former private family firms to enable future
venture growth. The selection of extreme cases where
the former family owners and managers left the firms
to different extents over time enabled examination of
‘how’ the professionalization process evolved in a
context of decreasing family involvement (De Massis
and Kotlar 2014). In relation to the research gap
concerning the process of professionalization in
family firms over time, we explore the following
research question:
Q1 How does the professionalization process evolve
pre- and post-MBO/I in former private family firms?
The cases were privately family-owned and family-
managed to a greater or lesser extent prior to MBO or
MBI. Attitudes, goals and behaviour were monitored
before, during and after the buyout. This provided the
opportunity to examine how the professionalization
process evolved, and how family exit and an increase
in external influences lead to changes in management
controls and processes associated with ‘professional’
management.
MostMBO/Is involve private largely family-owned
firms (CMBOR 2014) with incumbent managers
taking over ownership from the former owner-man-
ager(s). The MBO team sometimes includes next-
generation family members. MBIs involve a new
external management ownership team and can be
viewed as a distinct move towards professionalization
(Gilligan and Wright 2014). Post-buyout, the new
ownership team could introduce more formal gover-
nance mechanisms, greater use of planning and control
systems, and involvement of non-family board mem-
bers. MBO/Is may also be used to remove some family
members who wish to retire or do not contribute to
future firm development (Howorth et al. 2004). Family
firm owners may select an MBO to enable them to exit
and realize their investment while ensuring some
continuity of the former dominant family ethos,
particularly if some family members retain positions
in the firm. Stewardship relationships may continue
post-MBO/I.
We make the following contributions. First, we
provide fresh insights into how professionalization
evolves and how the professionalization process varies
in private family firms involved in MBO/Is. Second,
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we illustrate that professionalization is a process
occurring in waves, which intensify with firm owner-
ship and management changes. The MBO/I is an
important transitory phase enabling former family
firms to introduce formalized management control
systems. Conceptually, the buyout presents a fun-
nelling mechanism whereby systems and controls are
standardized. Third, we highlight that post-MBO/I
increased variation in control systems and processes
are contingent upon different types of ownership
change, and levels of continuing family involvement
associated with the relative importance of long or
short-term goals. Fourth, we integrate insights from
agency and stewardship theories. We conceptualize
how the relevance of stewardship and agency con-
structs change over time, shaping the nature and form
of the professionalization process. Fifth, we contribute
to understanding how family firms balance the best
aspects of professionalization and stewardship cul-
tures in their control systems and processes. Succes-
sion through MBO/I provides a juncture whereby the
former private family firm maintains its independent
ownership and sustains the stewardship culture, albeit
in a metamorphosed state.
2 Theoretical background
Family firm professionalization involves utilization of
formal governance mechanisms and strategic planning
and control systems, plus involvement of non-family
members on the board and in the management team.
Involvement of ‘outside’ professionals can bring fresh
objectivity to decision-making (Ibrahim et al. 2001). It
is wrong to assume that all family managers are
inherently not professional (Hall and Nordqvist 2008).
Despite numerous studies, there is no consensus
relating to whether family managers benefit family
firms (Minichilli et al. 2010). There is growing
acknowledgement that the dominant view of profes-
sionalized family business management is overly
simplistic when it focuses on non-family manager
employment (Dekker et al. 2015), notwithstanding
desires to preserve socioemotional wealth and short-
comings relating to family management (Colombo
et al. 2014).
Life-cycle theorists suggest introducing formal
management control systems is critical for firm
development. Threshold firms are those around the
point of transition from entrepreneurial to professional
management (Daily and Dalton 1992: 25). Entrepre-
neurial management involves founder centrality, ad
hoc planning and control, informal structures, basic
budgeting, and a ‘loosely defined family-oriented
culture’. Professionalization is associated with an
increase in management control systems and processes
formalizing management. Many studies adopt a sim-
plistic and narrow conceptualization of professional-
ization regarding employment of non-family
managers (Chrisman et al. 2013). A rare longitudinal
study (Lien and Li 2014) concluded that post-initial
public offering (IPO) family firms should combine
family control with professional (i.e. non-family)
management to improve performance.
A multi-faceted examination of family firm pro-
fessionalization is warranted. Professional manage-
ment relates to cultural and formal competence
regarding family or non-family managers (Hall and
Nordqvist 2008). Appreciation of dimensions of
professionalization has enabled identification of dif-
ferent types of family firms (Westhead and Howorth
2007; Dekker et al. 2015). Professionalization relates
to rights to use specialized knowledge, and morals,
capability and integrity of individuals (Stewart and
Hitt 2012), rather than increasing bureaucracy (Hall
and Nordqvist 2008). Studies generally provide little
understanding of how professionalization evolves and
how the professionalization process might vary. In
particular, contingent factors influencing the profes-
sionalization process have been neglected. Contin-
gency-based research examines links between
structure and processes of management control sys-
tems, and contextual variables associated with uncer-
tainty and external environmental complexity (Otley
1988). Control systems can relate more to firm-
specific contingencies post-MBO because MBOs
place increased emphasis on operational efficiency
and planning (Jones 1992). Yildirim-O¨ktem and
U¨sdiken (2010) found power and institutional per-
spectives were more appropriate than contingency
theory to explore the professionalization of family
business group boards, measured as governance
structure variables rather than control systems and
processes. However, the nature of board profession-
alization can be contingent upon the absorptive
capacity of firm founders seeking to cross the profes-
sionalization threshold (Zahra et al. 2009). The impact
of professionalization on post-succession performance
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in family-owned firms may be contingent upon
whether succession is to a family member or a non-
family professional manager (Chittoor and Das 2007).
Effecting such changes may require fundamental
changes to organizational processes, values and cul-
ture because they may challenge the legacy of the
founder (Gedajlovic et al. 2004).
We develop contingency-based approaches by
drawing on agency and stewardship theories. These
theories enable greater insights into different influ-
ences within the ownership and management struc-
tures shaping the professionalization process in former
private family firms that selected MBO/Is (Howorth
et al. 2004; Bruining et al. 2013). We conceptualize
how the relevance of stewardship and agency con-
structs change over time, shaping the nature and form
of the professionalization process.
2.1 Agency theory
Agency theory has been used in understanding inter-
actions between family owners and non-family man-
agers and in MBO/Is of family firms (Chrisman et al.
2012). Chrisman et al. (2004) noted that strategic
planning influenced the performance of non-family
firms more than family firms, implying lower agency
costs in family-owned firms. Studies across the MBO
life-cycle provide evidence for the validity of an
agency perspective (Bruton et al. 2002) showing that
post-buyout increased entrepreneurial and administra-
tive management increased the likelihood of private
equity (PE) investment.
Family firms are not homogeneous because they
vary in terms of goals, ownership and management
structures (Westhead and Howorth 2007; Kotlar and
De Massis 2013). Some family firms face agency
problems much earlier than others. For some family
firms, introducing governance and management mech-
anisms may reduce potential conflicts of interest
between family and non-family owners and managers,
and may control agency problems arising from
altruism or nepotism (Schulze et al. 2003).
2.2 Stewardship theory
Stewardship relationships are associated with the
stereotypical family firm (Schulze et al. 2003). Social
rather than formal controls may be used where there is
high goal alignment (Pieper et al. 2008). With a strong
stewardship culture in a family firm, formal manage-
ment controls associated with professionalization may
be inappropriate (Stewart and Hitt 2012). Some
elements of this may prevail post-MBO/I to restrict
the professionalization process. However, introduc-
tion of a PE investor may lead to a greater preponder-
ance of agency relationships and precipitate the
professionalization process.
2.3 Summary of theoretical insights
Contingency-based approaches have been criticized
for overemphasizing external context (Otley 1988)
rather than the role of internal culture, as embodied in
agency and stewardship perspectives, which is a key
theme in family firm studies. Prior studies provide
limited perspectives on thresholds, succession and
professionalization because they focus on ways of
effecting succession while retaining family ownership
in relation to succession as a one-off event. Limited
examination of internal and external influences on
professionalization structures in family firms (i.e.
narrow focus on governance variables) may, in part,
explain the claim that contingency theory may have
minimal explanatory power (Yildirim-O¨ktem and
U¨sdiken 2010). However, this may not be the case
regarding professionalization processes. We provide
fresh insights regarding the appropriateness of a
contingency-based approach to explore internal and
external firm issues shaping the professionalization
process in private firms pre- and post-MBO/I. The
buyout can retain family ownership but involves a more
fundamental break with the past than succession.
Monitoring firms post-MBO/I enables longer-term
examination of challenges in making changes to
processes, values and cultures, which is missing in
prior studies.We hold constant key contextual variables
to isolate the effect(s) of changes in family ownership
and management on the professionalization process in
firms over time. Notably, we highlight links between
the presence and exit of former family owners and
managers due to the MBO/I, and the nature and form of
professionalization processes pre- and post-MBO/I.
Agency theory suggests that as firm ownership and
management are diluted through a MBO/I, there will
be increased need to professionalize to control agency
costs. Stewardship theory indicates that examination
of motivations, relationships and information asym-
metries may shed light on variations in the
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professionalization process, and the use of formal and/
or social controls. Prior to MBO/I, family firms where
stewardship relationships prevail may have greater use
of informal methods and social controls. The MBO/I
may increase formalization, particularly with PE firm
involvement. A longitudinal qualitative approach
enables exploration of these complex interactions
between multiple factors relating to internal and
external environments. A contingency-based approach
building upon insights from agency and stewardship
theories provides understanding of how the profession-
alization process evolves, particularly variations related
to shifts in agency and stewardship constructs due to
changes in family and non-family ownership and
management.
3 Method
We adopt the logic of inductive inquiry that allows
new theoretical insights to emerge through the process
of gathering data frommultiple sources, analysing that
data through comparison, and iterating between
emerging conceptual insights and re-examination of
the data (Yin 2014; Reay 2014; De Massis and Kotlar
2014; Fletcher et al. 2015). A longitudinal study was
conducted involving six UK family firms undergoing a
MBO/I. MBO/Is provide ‘extreme cases’ (Siggelkow
2007) for studying family firm professionalization
because they involve a discrete event where family
ownership and management changes to non-family.
Data were collected at MBO/I in 1998 and subse-
quently from key informants up to 2014 as detailed
below. Company reports, financial data, ownership
and management data and media coverage were
obtained across the period 1998–2014.
3.1 Case selection
For the initial selection, we administered a postal
questionnaire to all MBO/Is completed in 1998 from
the Centre for Management Buyout Research
(CMBOR) database, which effectively comprises the
UK MBO/I population. From survey respondents
agreeing to a follow-up interview, we identified cases
that, prior to MBO/I, met the European Union
definition for private family firms as over 50 % of
shares were owned by a single family group related by
blood or marriage, family were involved in
management and the business was perceived as a
family business (Westhead and Cowling 1998). We
employed theoretical sampling to select respondents
with distinct differences (Eisenhardt and Graebner
2007) that ex ante might be expected to provide
variations in the professionalization process. We
sought first- and multi-generation firms because the
depth of family experience can increase if more
generations of the dominant family are involved in the
firm (Astrachan et al. 2002); stewardship may have
stronger roots and be more likely to prevail. We
includedMBOs andMBIs because the former includes
managers from within the firm and the latter involves
external managers who may be perceived as being
‘professional’ managers. The survey data also allowed
us to identify cases with varying levels of family
involvement post-MBO/I. Level of involvement of
family members may shape pre- and post-MBO/I
behaviour. Crucially, continuity of some family
involvement may be associated with fewer changes
post-MBO/I.
3.2 Data collection
Multiple sources of evidence enabled data to be cross-
checked, improving consistency and reliability. The
initial survey provided information on the family and
the firm, perceived reasons for MBO/I, the deal, and
changes in structure and strategy. Face-to-face inter-
views with vendors and acquirers in 2000/1 gathered
information on motivations of family firm owners and
MBO/I teams, antecedents, the deal process, and
changes post-MBO/I. Face-to-face and telephone
interviews with surviving firms in 2006 and 2014
explored changes in structure, operations and strategy.
Interviews comprised open questions to avoid leading
interviewees, focusing on changes since the previous
data collection point. Five firms interviewed in 2001
were re-interviewed in 2006. One firm was not re-
interviewed in 2006 due to closure. In 2014, owner-
ship and management data on all six firms were
obtained for the period pre-MBO/I to 2014. In 2014, of
surviving firms interviewed in 2006, one was inter-
viewed extensively because the family still had a role
in 2006, and a further two confirmed their current
status by telephone. The fourth was the subject of
extensive media coverage following a criminal court
case against the two family directors. This firm was
closed and subsequently sold in 2012 following their
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conviction. The fifth surviving firm was acquired in
2006. By obtaining data across the 16-year period up
to 2014, we examined all firms beyond final exit of
vendor families.
Nineteen interviews were held, separately, with
multiple respondents from each firm over time.
Respondents included former family owners, mem-
bers of the MBO/I teams, managers and senior
employees. Three interviews included two co-inter-
viewees. Four people were interviewed on multiple
occasions. Each 1–2 h interview was recorded and
transcribed verbatim. Anonymized case characteris-
tics are provided in Table 1.
3.3 Data analysis method
Data analysis was based on interpretive methods. Key
concepts and understandings were developed from
subjects’ interpretations. Interview transcripts from
2001, 2006 and 2014 were analysed manually using a
three-stage process of description, inference and
explanation. Manual coding and analysis were
employed, facilitating identification of causal links
and key concepts. Transcripts were coded and anal-
ysed using pattern-coding, tables and matrices. The
first author undertook initial analysis and coding.
Interpretations were checked with interviewees. Pat-
terns and inferences were discussed between authors.
Manual analysis allowed interviews to be read as a
whole and to be critically considered within context.
Data analysis aimed to identify themes, consistencies
or paradoxes regarding two ordered steps: first-order
analysis examined professionalization as firms went
through changes in ownership and management, while
second-order analysis involves development of con-
ceptual insights through analytical generalization.
Examples of data and early stage analysis are available
in the online only appendix.
4 Data analysis
The professionalization processes were compared
alongside changes in ownership and management
post-MBO/I. Levels of family ownership and man-
agement declined post-MBO/I in all firms except
TROLLEYS, which increased family ownership and
was fully owned by the next generation of the original
family 6 years post-MBO. Interviewees evidenced
views that polarized professional and family firms,
consistent with earlier studies suggesting profession-
alization is simply the introduction of non-family
management. Some non-family interviewees sug-
gested family firms were the antithesis of ‘profes-
sional’ or ‘proper’ firms. I think the company’s run
more professionally now… In family firms there’s a lot
of bickering and things… It’s not tolerated in a proper
company (PLANTS EMPLOYEE 2006). Here, the
MBO/I was presented as having legitimized the family
firm. Interestingly, the externally appointed managing
director (MD)1 of PLANTS stated (2001) Actually the
business had pretty good controls and systems, the one
strength of it before I came in was the systems were
good. For some, being a family firm was not some-
thing to be proud of. TheMD of TROLLEYS (in 2006)
did not consider his firm to be a family business,
despite being a second-generation family member, and
the business being owned fully by himself and his
sister. Negative connotations of family business were
more prevalent among firms managed very ad hoc pre-
MBO/I which reported few formal controls and
processes. In all these cases (PLANTS, PIPES and
TROLLEYS), the firms were previously owner-man-
aged and dominated by one individual. A contra effect
involved some non-family managers joining the
smaller former private family firms, in part, due to
prior negative experience of ‘professional’ manage-
ment in large companies. These differences indicate a
dichotomized view of family versus ‘professional’
management is an over-simplification of the profes-
sionalization process.
4.1 Professionalization in family firms pre-MBO/I
Contrary to life-cycle perspectives, there were no
discernible patterns in professionalization relative to
firm size or age. The largest firms (DUMPS and
PLANTS) and the oldest (PIPES) reported ad hoc and
unsystematic management pre-MBO/I. This high-
lights that professionalization does not happen auto-
matically as family firms grow and suggests other
factors influence the professionalization process.
Within-case and cross-case analysis identified
variation in levels and focus of professionalization
pre-MBO/I. Nearly all cases indicated owner-centric
1 MD = Commonly used term relating to privately held firms
in the UK, and is equivalent to Chief Executive Officer.
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Table 1 Case descriptions
LOCKS BOXES DUMPS PIPES PLANTS TROLLEYS
Industry Engineering Paper/print Construction Merchant Horticulture Engineering
Founded 1965 1963 1979 Pre-1928 1972 1979
Turnover £m
1998a:2005
4.6:3.8 2.5:not known 20:n.a. 4:18.2b 24:30.4 6
Employees
1998:2005/
6
120:99 45:25 114:n.a. 30:75 300:221 65:60
Deal finance Debt. Debt. Private equity (captive) Private equity
(independent)
Private equity (captive) Private equity (captive)
Vendor
succession
style
Staged exit: Co-
operative and
participative
Retirement,
ambassador,
co-operative
Retirement, hedonist,
antagonistic
Illness, low knowledge
transfer
Retirement, co-operative Illness, un-co-operative
Ownership
changes
since 1998
Former owner’s
minority shares
bought in 2006
2nd MBO in
2006
Closed in 2003.
Subsidiary sold out of
receivership
MBI team bought out in
2000
2006 bought by
competitor
MBO team xc 1 sold in 2001. 2
VCs bought out in 2004/6.
76 % owned by MD; 24 % by
FD
MBO lead and VC bought
out 2001. Other MBO
member bought out
2003
Control
changes
MD retired in
2002. New
board structure
in 2006
Changes in directors in
1999, 2002 and 2004.
MD resigned in 2003
New board structure in
2000, 2006. Changes in
directors in 2005 and
2007
MD replaced in 1999. Director
resignations in 2000, 2001.
2003 and 2004
New board structure 2004
Family
involvement
Family vendor on
board until 2006.
12.5 % in trust for
family
None in firm.
Family own
business’
premises
None since MBI Son of vendor employed
until 2000
Son of vendor employed as
director until 2000
Continuing. 50/50 owned
by son and daughter of
vendor and founder
MBO team
involvement
All original team still
involved in similar
roles
1 of 4 first MBO
team in 2nd
MBO
MBI lead resigned in
2003. One involved
till liquidation
All MBI team resigned by
2000
FD was 1 of 4 in original team 2 of 4 in original team
Interviewed
2006?
MD MD No Financial controller MD and employee MD
n.a. not available, MD Managing director, FD Financial director, VC private equity company
a Last complete financial year pre-MBO/I
b 2006 data because 2005 not available
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management and non-participatory leadership pro-
cesses pre-MBO/Is. For example, The guy who ran the
business knew everything, could do everybody’s job
better than they could (PLANTS MD); and It was a
one-man band in a way (PLANTS VENDOR).
Vendors, employees, MBO/I team members and
family members provided evidence of non-participa-
tory leadership.
Cases varied in their introduction of external (non-
family) managers: I’d tried to bring in senior people
and for one reason or another it hadn’t worked
(PLANTS, VENDOR 2001); He had a number of
contractor directors…and they were highly incen-
tivized…that’s how he had grown the business
(DUMPS MD 2001). A shared leadership model was
observed in LOCKS, where the Chair was a family
owner and the MD was appointed externally years
prior to MBO.
Variation in management control processes pre-
MBO/Is ranged from non-existent to sophisticated
use: We’ve got very good financial management
controls in place (which) we’ve built up over many
years….There weren’t a lot of additional things (i.e.
changes post MBO) (LOCKS MD 2001), compared
with: What used to happen, because [family owners]
had loads of money… [family owner] would just
wander round the warehouse, if the bin was empty
he’d just go away and order a pallet load of those
fittings and then he could forget about it for six months
(PIPES ACC 2001). Fewer management control
processes were associated with the most owner-centric
family firms.
Introduction of management control processes
occurred incrementally over many years, suggesting
professionalization was not a single action event.
Cross-case analysis indicated the validity of a contin-
gency-based explanation of why some firms were
slower to professionalize. For example, PIPES had
‘plenty of cash’; BOXES’ ‘sales were good’; and
PLANTS was well-placed as the leading supplier in
their industry. Firms with fewer management control
processes (PIPES) tended to have less uncertainty and
complexity, particularly in their sales environment and
were in slow-changing, low-technology industries.
Firms with more management controls and processes
pre-MBO/I (LOCKS) were in more complex indus-
tries, facing greater sales uncertainty. Stewardship
relationships might increase internal certainty within
private family firms and thus be associated with fewer
formal management controls and less likelihood to
seek managers externally.
4.2 Professionalization in preparation for exit
and succession
The MBO/I boosted the professionalization process,
forming part of exit preparations in some firms.
External advisers were employed in all cases. Firms
preparing for MBI were more likely to implement new
processes than those preparing for MBO. Also, firms
targeting PE funding were more likely to put new
processes and structures in place pre-MBO/I. For
example: He [vendor] dressed it up a little bit, for
example, did he have a business development manager?
Yes he did but only just, he’d just appointed him,
probably after he’d started speaking to me (DUMPS,
MD 2001). LOCKS and BOXES, not funded by PE,
placed greater emphasis on knowledge transfer pre- and
post-MBO. Both paid less attention to management
control processes, and ‘window dressing’. Private
family firms preparing for MBO/I appear more likely
to boost the professionalization process when it is
anticipated that buying teams will include members
external to the family firm (e.g. PE investor,MBI team),
in line with agency theoretic notions of signalling.
4.3 Professionalization post-MBO/I
Without prompting, interviewees used the word ‘pro-
fessional’ in discussing changes post-MBO/I. BOXES
thought they were more professional in what they do.
Three cases introduced ‘external’ MDs. In each, the
MDs talked about professionalizing as making
improvements reflecting their experience in larger
companies (i.e. decentralizing control). The MD and
lead member of the MBI team in DUMPS stated they
intended to get this team and manage it profession-
ally…give people more authority…more freedom. An
employee in PLANTS, mentioned earlier, stated that
the company was run more professionally now. To
confirm her view, the former family owner’s attitude is
exemplified in describing the incoming MBO team as
follows: They did… business planning, all this sort of
rubbish. The new MD of PLANTS stated the impor-
tance of bringing in professional management, but
explained that employees placed a low value on his
management experience compared to knowing the
names of all the plants.
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Within-case analysis showed the MBO/I led to
increased professionalization across every firm.
Where not already in place, the MBO/I triggered an
increased focus on profitability, more control pro-
cesses, performance-related rewards, formal gover-
nance structure, participative leadership, changes in
organization structures, and more strategic planning.
There was considerable consistency of mechanisms
adopted immediately post-MBO/I. All firms without
monthly management accounts introduced them post-
MBO/I, irrespective of type of MBO/I funding.
LOCKS had formal structures and systems pre-
MBO, but post-MBO, there was increased decentral-
ization, changes in management structure, and for-
malization of governance roles.
The professionalization process was implemented
through personnel changes: so the team was changed
[PLANTS MD 2006 discussing 1999]; and structure
changes engineering business is [now] split into three
[with] their own operating budgets and financial
targets and controls (LOCKSMD 2001). Training and
staff development were emphasized to enable profes-
sionalization processes: We’ve trained all the sales
staff, trained the admin staff, a bit more discipline in
terms of administration, rules and regulations, health
and safety, to try and help develop the people
(TROLLEYS MD 2001). All firms, except TROL-
LEYS, had an external board representative. In some
(PIPES and PLANTS), PE investors appointed exter-
nalMDs. PLANTS and PIPES suffered difficulties due
to poor management skills of second-generation
family members who wished to be involved post-
MBO/I. These firms brought in external MDs within
2 years post-MBO/I. In both, this was the major
trigger for increased professionalization. For PIPES,
this included replacing ‘stock control by wandering’
with management and stock control processes plus
computerized invoicing.
In several firms, where professionalization led to
tightening up of slack, there was some employee
resistance, notably when firms attempted to link
bonuses to performance (DUMPS and PIPES).
Clearly, there is potential for self-interest in private
family firms and non-family firms.
MBO/Is introduced an additional layer of com-
plexity due to the financial risk of debt in the deal
structure. Contingency-based research has associated
such factors with an increase in management control
systems (Jones 1992). PE investors especially bring
the firm into a new agency relationship. There can be
strict requirements for control systems and higher
leverage requires closer monitoring of cash flow. MBI
teams, as outsiders, are more likely to experience
uncertainty due to asymmetric information challenges
and associated agency relationships within the firm.
To address these issues, they, therefore, introduce
agency controls.
In sum, the MBO/I acts like a ‘funnelling mecha-
nism’ shaping the professionalization process post-
MBO/I. Despite divergence in former private family
firms pre-MBO/I, there is considerable convergence of
professionalization post-MBO/I. Irrespective of back-
ground, post-MBO/I firms exhibited considerable
consistency in governance structures, control systems
and processes introduced. Personnel changes were
important in driving professionalization.
4.4 Later years: post-family exit
To examine patterns in changes in professionalization
beyond the MBO/I transition period, we analysed the
period 8–16 years post-MBO/I. By 2006, consistent
with PE time horizons (Gilligan and Wright 2014), PE
firms had exited most firms. Vendor families varied in
their involvement post-MBO/I. By 2006, only TROL-
LEYS and LOCKS still had vendor family involve-
ment. Further ownership changes were common-
place, often in a move towards ownership consolida-
tion. There was no discernible pattern concerning the
vendor family concluding exit, and the introduction of
further professionalization. By 2014, LOCKS had no
family involvement, and formal management struc-
tures were more relaxed. It’s disintegrated…until
2013…very formal systems…we don’t meet as often
as we used to (LOCKS, MD 2014). In contrast, other
firms introduced more formal systems when family
involvement ended (PLANTS and BOXES). Intro-
duction of formal control processes led to exit of the
remaining family member in PIPES.
Eight years post-MBO/I, and after PE investor exit,
data show further waves and ripples of professional-
ization, but with a shift in emphasis, and considerable
variation among firms. The professionalization pro-
cess over this time period emphasized more strategic
planning, financial planning, training and develop-
ment, innovation and culture changes. Control systems
and processes were now discussed in terms of ‘how’
they were used rather than ‘what’ they consisted of as
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highlighted in earlier interviews. For example, the
commercial director of BOXES had previously dis-
cussed budget minutiae, but now emphasized how the
tools were used, and how they helped him understand
what was going on. Interviewees illustrated increased
taken-for-granted mastery over controls and systems.
The professionalization process was enhanced by
interviewees’ stronger views about what worked.
Interviewees were also more open about when they
got something wrong. Interestingly, by this stage there
was divergence because some firms no longer used
external directors. We had one guy who was a non-
executive director, we got to a point that we felt we
didn’t need him… After we talked to the bank they felt
comfortable that we were as a team, perhaps experi-
enced enough not to need that (BOXES MD 2006);
[PE] think they’ve got their man in and actually, you
know, he’s 90 % on your side…When he first came in
we’d have a pre-board meeting so he didn’t effectively
manage the board …By the time he left it was a 2 h
board meeting looking at strategy and real issues
(PLANTS MD 2006); and [Non-executive directors]
No never have done. I think there was lots of pressure
from the VC back…. but we just dug our heels in and
said no…We do have an external guy we work with…
we have a formal meeting with him every two months,
off-site, fixed agenda, minutes, …and it works very
well (TROLLEYS MD 2006).
In 2006, there was more evidence of elements
associated with stewardship relationships than
observed immediately post-MBO/I. Interviewees
reported high identification with the organization,
involvement oriented, low power distance cultures and
a tendency to put the business’ objectives above
personal ones. Centralization of management high-
lighted in surviving firms appeared associated with
strong firm attachment and longer-term goals. For
example, For me, it’s a long-term thing you know. I’ve
worked here pretty much since I left college… it’s my
life… I love it… I’m here for the long haul (BOXES,
internal MD, 2006). Interviewees brought in as
‘external’ MDs, however, showed less attachment
and shorter-term goals: Actually I’m doing a job, it’s
not an extension of my personality (PLANTS, external
MD, 2006).
The professionalization process was linked to
changes in organizational culture. For example, the
big challenge was changing it from a family culture to
a… professional culture… we were able to instil in
people that they were part of the team. Their job
wasn’t to do what [family owner] said, their job was to
offer their skills, their intelligence to do the best job
they could (PLANTS MD 2006). However, the same
interviewee went onto highlight a reversion to a
‘family culture’: over the last seven years, we’ve
removed [PE] as a shareholder… and it’s almost
come full circle back to being almost like the family
business again… but with a different culture. The
interviewee indicated the firm had achieved a balance
between the best aspects of professional and family
cultures, but the one thing I’ve got to be aware of is
that I don’t just start slowly dripping in what’s wrong
about a family business back into it (PLANTS MD
2006).
In line with contingency-based approaches, analy-
sis suggests once standard control processes associ-
ated with professionalization were in place, firms
adapted and developed in diverse directions, depend-
ing on individual circumstances. Firm goals also
shaped the professionalization process. For example,
LOCKS’ MD in 2014 took a long-term view:
Constantly thinking about succession planning…al-
ways had this cycle, this up and down cycle…we’ve
persevered…we’ve spent 10 years developing new
products for different markets and these are sustain-
able (LOCKS, MD, 2014). The emphasis was on
introducing management processes concerning pro-
duct quality control and product development. In
contrast, PIPES had a clear goal to sell the firm. Here,
management control processes remained tight in order
to maintain firm saleability.
5 Discussion and conclusions
5.1 Findings
Our analysis shows that ‘threshold’ conceptualisations
of a once-for-all shift from entrepreneurialism to
professionalization are an oversimplification. Table 2
summarizes our main findings, highlighting that
professionalization is a process rather than an event,
occurring in waves of varying sizes and foci. Despite
variations in level and focus pre-MBO/I, profession-
alization increased post-MBO/I, characterized by
convergence, with firms reporting comparable levels
of formalization and introduction of similar controls.
Figure 1 represents this funnelling effect on the
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professionalization process that generally resulted in
adoption of standardized management control pro-
cesses post-MBO/I. Figure 1 and Table 2 also demon-
strate the continuation of the professionalization
process post-MBO/I over many years. Figure 1 illus-
trates that pre-MBO/I there was considerable variation
in levels and foci of professionalization, contingent on
the specific context of each firm. Stewardship rela-
tionships moderated the contingency imperative:
where stewardship relationships were strong, fewer
formal controls and therefore less professionalization
were evident. In preparing for MBO/I, Fig. 1 shows
that professionalization through formalization
increases. Where sale is to external parties (MBI),
signalling is more relevant; furthermore professional-
ization at this stage is moderated by the type of
funding as PE investors might have greater informa-
tion asymmetry, and signalling becomes more
important than with debt funding. Thus, agency theory
dominates explanations of professionalization at this
stage. During and immediately after MBO/I, analysis
showed standardization and increasing of profession-
alization. This funnelling effect is driven by increased
involvement of external, non-family managers and
investors and is moderated by levels of uncertainty and
risk faced by individual firms; greater uncertainty and
risk strengthens the effect of external managers and
investors on professionalization. In later stages post-
MBO/I, Fig. 1 illustrates the greater divergence
observed as firms continued to professionalize in
directions contingent on their own individual circum-
stances, internally and externally.
Changes in ownership and management triggered
‘waves of professionalization’. Notably, in later years,
specific variations in ownership or management could
lead to a focus on operational controls, or agency
Table 2 Waves of professionalization: summary of findings
Family firm pre-
MBO/I
Preparation for MBO/I Immediately post-
MBO/I
Later years
Professionalization is
characterized by
Variation
Low levels
Increase
Window dressing
Funnelling
mechanism
Increase
Convergence
Divergence
Common themes include Owner-centric
Ad hoc control
Fire fighting
Formalization Standardization
Agency controls
Talk about being
‘professional’
Mastery of management
tools
Reflexive and proactive
External director exit
Professionalization process
occurs through
Incremental
adjustments
Tightening operational
controls
Formalizing roles
Personnel changes
Structure changes
Incentivization
‘Tweaking’
Staff development
External
representation
Staff development
Culture change
Long-term planning
Simplification and
extension
Changes in professionalization
are associated with
Contingency-based
explanations
Complexity and
uncertainty
Recommendation of
external advisors
Expectation of external
sale
External investors’
requirements
External
appointments
Contingency-based
adaptation to context
Goals of the owner-
manager
Investor exit (but not
family exit)
Influences are moderated by Stewardship
relationships
Type of funding pre-
MBO/I
Uncertainty
Financial risk
Family involvement
Dominant explanatory theory Contingency
Stewardship
Agency Agency Contingency
Stewardship
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control mechanisms. We detect that agency theory
alone does not fully explain changes in management
control systems and processes. Stewardship relation-
ships were associated with emphasis on operational
control processes to manage the business, rather than
agency controls to align motivations. Longer-term
stewardship relationships re-emerged once agency
relationships had been reduced, for example, follow-
ing exit of financial investors.
Figure 2 highlights the drivers and moderators of
different professionalization waves, illustrating most
powerfully that drivers and moderators differ across
waves. Figures 1 and 2 emphasize the value of
employing complementary theories to understand
changes in professionalization over time. By utilizing
a longitudinal approach, we extend insights from
relatively narrow cross-sectional contingency-based
approaches that explain the introduction of control
processes to help understand the professionalization
process. We suggest that cross-sectional quantitative
studies may have severe limitations in assessing the
level of professionalization achieved. Future longitu-
dinal quantitative studies will provide additional
insights relating to the scale and nature of the adoption
of particular types of controls, structures and systems.
5.2 Implications for private family firms post-
MBO/I
Our rich longitudinal analysis highlights there was no
simple consistent pattern of association between
family exit and the professionalization process. Where
family members had a long-term continuing role post-
MBO/I, exit was associated with relaxation of man-
agement control processes. For some family members,
increased management control processes post-MBO/I
constrained ability to act in pursuit of their own goals,
leading to exit.
Notably, buyouts can provide a dynamic mecha-
nism to reconcile notions of professionalization and
stewardship within former private family firms. This
suggests family owners not wishing to effect
Standardisation
Pre-MBO/I
Preparation for 
MBO/I
Post-MBO/I
Later years
Contingency
Stewardship
Contingency
Stewardship
Agency
Agency
Variation
Formalization
Divergence
Phase Dominant TheoryFig. 1 Funnelling effect of
MBO/I on
professionalisation
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succession may trigger the professionalization process
by, say, introducing external management. External
managers can have a key role in triggering a profes-
sionalization wave concerning the introduction of
management controls and processes. Family firms
seeking to retain some family ethos following exit
might consider MBOs rather than MBIs. To realize this
choice, family firms may need to build a credible tier of
non-family management before MBO for it to be
feasible. Successful firms post-MBO/I can also remove
negative aspects associated with being a family firm
(i.e. free-riding, shirking and inequitable treatment).
However, post-MBO/I they need to build on positive
aspects associated with being a family firm (i.e. loyalty,
long-term commitment and trust). MBO/I succession
provides a juncture when the status quo regarding
family, management and ownership interaction can be
reconfigured. This may be more difficult to achieve in a
linear progression to family ownership succession.
Post-MBO/I, theremay be resistance to being perceived
as a family firm because it is ‘less professional’, not
helped by some conceptualizations distinguishing
between family and ‘professional’ management sug-
gesting family managers are inherently not professional
(Hall and Nordqvist 2008).
Our findings may assist family firm owners, poten-
tial MBO/I teams and their advisors and financiers.
Sustainability of elements of stewardship can underpin
long-term strategy. Failure to acknowledge this, and
over-emphasis on agency issues, may lead to misun-
derstanding of the motivations of firms, and poten-
tially lead to provision of inappropriate advice. An
MBO/I may provide an important transitory form that
facilitates professionalization. Advisors and PE finan-
ciers may need to structure MBO/Is to incorporate
longer-term independent ownership rather than exit as
a trade sale, such as by promoting the extended
application of secondary MBOs (CMBOR 2014).
Family firms should carefully consider the nature of
PE firms because they differ in terms of their
investment exit time horizons.
5.3 Limitations and further research
Limitations provide avenues for further research. First,
research is needed using a wider representative sample
of former private family firms selecting a MBO/I
succession route to establish the empirical generaliz-
ability of our insights. Second, studies are needed to
examine the issues considered here in other institu-
tional contexts where notions of agency, stewardship
and family firm successionmay be different, but where
MBO/Is play a role in succession. This may add to the
development of the contingency perspective presented
Professionalizaon 
Wave
Reflexive
Mastery
Drivers: 
Simplificaon;
Long term plan;
Extension
Development
Adaptaon
Drivers: 
Adaptaon to context;
Investor risk
Standardisaon
Control
Drivers: 
External investors;
External 
appointments
Formalisaon
Signalling
Drivers: 
External advisors;
Expectaons of risk
Ad hoc 
Conngent
Drivers: 
Conngency factors;
Complexity; 
Uncertainty
Moderated by:
Uncertainty
Risk
Moderated by:
Involvement 
of family
Moderated by:
Owner manager
goals
Moderated by:
Type of 
funding
Moderated by:
Stewardship
relaonships
Fig. 2 Waves of professionalization: drivers and moderators
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here. Third, our selection of extreme cases focuses
only on different types of MBO/Is; a further interest-
ing extension would be to compare MBO/Is with the
development of professionalization in family firms
that undertake succession to subsequent generations,
or external management. Future research might also
compare how the professionalization process evolves
in other succession contexts. For example, some
family firms effect exit through being acquired by
corporations, but may subsequently buy the firm back.
Similarly, some MBO/Is of family firms are subse-
quently rebought by the family. Fourth, we did not
explore the relationship between firm professionaliza-
tion and buyout performance. A different research
design may be required to explore links with firm
performance.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis
highlights that the process of family firm development
is not linear. Presented longitudinal case evidence
illustrates that it is more complex and is associated
with waves of professionalization. This finding opens
the way for more general studies of professionaliza-
tion in family firms guided by insights from steward-
ship and agency perspectives.
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